This week’s readings situate two very different theoretical positions against each other. At first glance, it seems that hedonics and pleasure would be related to the idea of positive psychology, but I soon discovered that they could not be further separated.
Positive psychology seeks to ameliorate the human condition. It is outward-looking, philanthropic in nature, and in my opinion is a refreshing breath of fresh air. When I last studied psychology, in the 1970s, much of the body of work that we are reading in this class had yet to be created. A great deal of it has been rather difficult for me to assimilate, coming as I do from a viewpoint that tends more to the humanistic and traditional.
Even so, much of the work we have read in this class is instructive and fascinating. My most salient criticism of some of the newer work I have encountered in this class, however, is that the studies and papers I find most problematic seem, if not exclusively, then disturbingly, self-referential. Some researchers appear to treat the theory at hand as the most important element of the equation, and the humans and animals involved in the research are but puzzles to be taken apart and fitted back together in the image of the researcher’s ideology. Often the clinical trials and studies appear biased and to have been designed to prove the researchers’ ideas, and are written up less than clearly, without adequate details.
Worse, the logic involved often seems convoluted and not really based on . . . well . . . logic.
Take, for example, Gilbert et al. on The Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad. Their main premise is based on a so-called paradox in which the authors ponder how odd it is that a person using a faster mode of transportation will arrive at his or her destination, though it is further from their origin, than another person using a slower mode of transport but traveling a shorter distance.
They attempt to associate this “paradox” with the rebound effect they describe whereby some more severe harms or illnesses are healed more quickly by more intense medical attention and treatment than some less severe ailments. From here, they jump to the thought that this effect can be reproduced psychologically, again trying to associate this idea with the more rapid healing of illnesses by more intense treatment. The thing that isn’t lining up for me is that I don’t think you can just use any old paradox (which this isn't, by the way) to illustrate or prove another. It's an entirely different situation, and may be ironic to some degree but none of these are really a paradox, if the mechanisms work as the authors say they do. It is not counter-intuitive or even difficult to believe that certain illnesses, treated aggressively, could respond more quickly than less intense illness or injury left untreated. This model also leaves out the many severe illnesses and injuries that no treatment can heal.
As to the travel "paradox", a commuter may choose different modes of transport for reasons other than travel time. The walk or bike ride may be good exercise, and the individual may be able to spare the half hour or whatever the shorter trip may take by the slower method, but not be able to spare an entire day to travel to a neighboring city by the same slow mode of travel. As for degree of counter-intuitiveness, neither intuition nor counter-intuition are needed to know that it could take much longer for a much shorter trip using a slower mode of travel, and that you may easily be able to get to the next town quicker by car than you could walk to your local market. I just might not have all day to go to the next town, but could spare half an hour to walk to the market, and perhaps even save time as I might not have to go to the gym that day.
The New York to London trip vs. traveling to Boston is similar in content and intuitiveness. Plane rides to London do not offer an opportunity to interact with the scenery along the way as slower modes of travel might. Thus, had one the time, one might choose to drive from New York to Boston in order to enjoy the scenery and stop in one's favorite seaside towns along the way, rather than taking the Metroliner, which is faster and cheaper but not as rewarding in both tangible and intangible ways. Likewise the same individual might choose not to take a cruise to London, although that also offers rewarding interaction with interesting scenery but may take much longer than the time one has available. I see no real paradox here, unless every contrasting choice one could make in life constitutes a paradox.
If you want a paradox, you need to look at either a duck-billed platytpus, or something apparently based on logic but actually not possible, or at quantum mechanics where measuring one particle changes properties in another at some distance but where the first can not possibly communicate with the second in any traditional way. What these people are calling a paradox is actually a kind of situational irony.
Additionally, the authors use an example of a wife rationalizing her husband’s infidelity but not getting over leaving dirty dishes in the sink. This is yet another bad example, and causes me to further question the thinking of these researchers. They completely ignore one obvious facet of their premise; the fact that one relationship causes more pain than another when serious problems arise implies that there is more at stake in that relationship, and more serious transgressions may go unchallenged for a number of reasons. A person might accept his or her partner's having an affair rather than lose that person for any number of reasons. The reason the affair has taken place must have included at least some element of the dynamic of the relationship. The cuckolded partner might actively drive the other away, either consciously or unconsciously, yet be unwilling to let them go entirely. Or the philandering partner may be more dominant and know that their more submissive other will put up with their behavior from fear of being alone (or any of many possible psychic hurts.) Whatever the reason for the affair, it may be less threatening to either or both partners to squabble over the dishes in the sink than to deal with the myriad implications and consequences of an affair, even in the best possible relationship (under the circumstances.)
Furthermore, and more to the point that I am trying to make, these authors have set everything up around a negative, dysfunctional model, seemingly to make the point that people are better off managing their expectations by choosing the very worst of several unappealing options, on the theory that in the end they will feel better about (for example) losing an entire office than a file cabinet. The disease model here seems itself diseased!
On the other hand, Positive Psychology has a purpose outside itself. It seeks, in a lovely and utopian way, to improve the entire world. This might seem unrealistic, but why? Perhaps because of the disease model that has dominated psychology since the end of the second world war, a time when paranoia ruled the world and children were told to hide under their desks in case of a nuclear attack.
Several years ago, I read a book entitled Goodbye To All That by Robert Graves, about how the world was changed forever by the first world war – how an innocence was lost and men on battlefields attacked each other not with swords and “glory” but with cowardice and poison gas. I found it depressing, raised as I was by a father who was born the year the war ended, who was himself raised by parents who grew up before this terrible war that changed the entire world. He was taught, and taught me, that there is something sublime about life and about the world, even when things are really, really rough. When it becomes hard to see any transcendent quality to alleviate the harsher side of things, life becomes more onerous.
Graves’ book seemed to explain a great deal; it all seemed to fit together with the overwhelmingly prevalent disease model in medicine coupled with increasing poor health of most citizens of developed nations, the crumbling social systems of our own country and much of the world, pollution and global warming increasing out of control, an observable decline in all sorts of social standards, and so much more that adds up to an apparent emptiness in so much of modern life.
This is why I am so elated to have read the articles on Positive Psychology. That a group of psychological authorities has created such a body of work emphasizing the best of the human spirit comes as a delightful surprise. That they see the value of prevention in mental illness is stunningly wonderful. These scientists seek not to gloss over reality with platitudes and pretty ideas lacking substance, but to build a new psychology based on what is best in the creatures it studies. These people are not “new age” dreamers, but experienced and seasoned researchers who know the difference between reality and ideological dreams, even when those dreams are nightmares. Their work gives me new hope, which I believe is an essential element in a healthy psyche. It was a pleasure to read these articles, and I will definitely seek out more information on Positive Psychology.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Emotions Below Our Radar
This weeks readings touched on the differences between conscious and unconscious emotional stimuli/experiences, ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, and the importance of optimism. The topics addressed seemed to have value beyond improving our understanding of human behavior, they seemed to reveal information that could be useful to the development of techniques for improving health and overall quality of life. Although I was not thoroughly sold on all of the papers, they each succeeded to alter my perception and spark new questions.
Berridge challenged my theory of emotions in his article on unconscious emotions. Up until these readings I had been formulating a theory based on a notion that we have a significant amount of control over our emotions, and in denying this control we are shirking off some of our responsibility for our actions. While one may indeed act on behalf of an emotional impulse, the lack of control or awareness is due to conditioned responses, laziness, or pathological conditions (it is not our fault though, we are taught to be this way). Berridge and colleagues experimentally demonstrated an unconscious emotional response (that did not have any negative connotations). Using subliminal images and an open juice bar they were able identify what they considered to be emotional responses based on the subjects behavior (beverage consumption). While these responses were apparent to the trained eye, the subjects were reportedly unaware of their emotional displays. Although I do not quite understand the beverage consumption model, I trust that they had good reason.
Berridge and colleagues raised another issue that challenged my current understandings. They distinguish between ‘wanting’ ( which they also refer to as sensitized incentive salience, “an underlying implicit and subjective process”) and ‘liking’ (“an objective affective reaction”). With this distinction in mind, they attempted to investigate the differences between wanting and liking on a neurological level. They acknowledge that this concept may seem counterintuitive, and suggest that the differences in experience may be discrete and thus fall below our radar. They further suggest that irrational desires, desire for things that are not particularly pleasant, may be provoked by the wanting system and falsely interpreted as liking. The authors describe a case in which a certain factor (B-19) evoked a desire for further stimulation and sexual arousal, but did not evoke an orgasm or statements to the effect of “that feels good”. Thus, the desire for further stimulation was not due to the pleasantness/liking, but rather brain activity that causes irrational ‘wanting’.
Despite their observation of different neurological pathways that evoke distinct responses, I have trouble accepting their distinction between wanting and liking. Is there not some pleasure in the act of wanting? I do not see how you could want something in the absence of a foreseeable reward. In that case does the motivation for the ‘want’ not invoke a sense of pleasure in and of itself? Is sexual arousal not a pleasant feeling (even sans orgasm)? And is desire for further stimulation not indicative of an enjoyable experience, or an experience with some type of desirable reward? I understand how wanting is not always pleasurable, but can wanting occur without some foreseeable reward? We would not do something if we did not hope to get something pleasurable out of it (at least I cannot think of any examples). There must be some level of reward that seems worthwhile even in the unhealthiest of behaviors. Although I clearly remain dissatisfied by their distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, this work does shed light on possible neurological underpinnings of drug addiction, eating disorders, obsession, and depression, and may be useful in developing methods for treating these disorders.
Berridge challenged my theory of emotions in his article on unconscious emotions. Up until these readings I had been formulating a theory based on a notion that we have a significant amount of control over our emotions, and in denying this control we are shirking off some of our responsibility for our actions. While one may indeed act on behalf of an emotional impulse, the lack of control or awareness is due to conditioned responses, laziness, or pathological conditions (it is not our fault though, we are taught to be this way). Berridge and colleagues experimentally demonstrated an unconscious emotional response (that did not have any negative connotations). Using subliminal images and an open juice bar they were able identify what they considered to be emotional responses based on the subjects behavior (beverage consumption). While these responses were apparent to the trained eye, the subjects were reportedly unaware of their emotional displays. Although I do not quite understand the beverage consumption model, I trust that they had good reason.
Berridge and colleagues raised another issue that challenged my current understandings. They distinguish between ‘wanting’ ( which they also refer to as sensitized incentive salience, “an underlying implicit and subjective process”) and ‘liking’ (“an objective affective reaction”). With this distinction in mind, they attempted to investigate the differences between wanting and liking on a neurological level. They acknowledge that this concept may seem counterintuitive, and suggest that the differences in experience may be discrete and thus fall below our radar. They further suggest that irrational desires, desire for things that are not particularly pleasant, may be provoked by the wanting system and falsely interpreted as liking. The authors describe a case in which a certain factor (B-19) evoked a desire for further stimulation and sexual arousal, but did not evoke an orgasm or statements to the effect of “that feels good”. Thus, the desire for further stimulation was not due to the pleasantness/liking, but rather brain activity that causes irrational ‘wanting’.
Despite their observation of different neurological pathways that evoke distinct responses, I have trouble accepting their distinction between wanting and liking. Is there not some pleasure in the act of wanting? I do not see how you could want something in the absence of a foreseeable reward. In that case does the motivation for the ‘want’ not invoke a sense of pleasure in and of itself? Is sexual arousal not a pleasant feeling (even sans orgasm)? And is desire for further stimulation not indicative of an enjoyable experience, or an experience with some type of desirable reward? I understand how wanting is not always pleasurable, but can wanting occur without some foreseeable reward? We would not do something if we did not hope to get something pleasurable out of it (at least I cannot think of any examples). There must be some level of reward that seems worthwhile even in the unhealthiest of behaviors. Although I clearly remain dissatisfied by their distinction between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, this work does shed light on possible neurological underpinnings of drug addiction, eating disorders, obsession, and depression, and may be useful in developing methods for treating these disorders.
Monday, April 9, 2007
positive psychology
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s introduction to the “Positive Psychology” issue of American Psychologist emphasizes the need to develop the study of a “positive psychology” that would discuss the effects of optimism on overall health, wisdom, talent, and creativity in individuals, yet more importantly, how this could be productive within a social/political future. In the first paragraph of their introduction, they write,
“Entering a new millennium, Americans face a historical choice. Left alone on the pinnacle of economic and political leadership, the United Sates can continue to increase its material wealth while ignoring the human needs of its people and those of the rest of the planet. Such a course is likely to lead to increasing selfishness, to alienation between the more and the less fortunate, and eventually to chaos and despair...Psychology should be able to help document what kinds of families result in children who flourish, what work settings support the greatest satisfaction among workers, what policies result in the strongest civic engagement, and how people’s lives can be most worth living.”
It is fascinating to me that this article was written in January 2000, just before the 2000 presidential election. It seems like this article was almost intended to convey a need for optimism that will be helpful in the future. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s article stresses the importance of working towards a discourse on positive psychology that would benefit our society in the long run, in terms of community, family, education, and so forth. This need stems from the past and current focus on pathology and “damaged” brains instead of putting attention towards the need to develop the positive aspects of our psychological cognitive and unconscious abilities.
On reading this paper, one personal event came to mind. Last weekend I went to Providence for Passover where my aunt lives. One day we took the whole family (all 25 of us) to see these mosaic installations that my aunt did as community projects in my cousin Sophie’s old elementary school (she has done one every year for the past ten years). She works with classes (usually 5th graders) to create mosaic murals based on a general theme and the children’s’ own drawings. For example, one mural showed all the kids favorite places in Providence. Another was about family heirlooms (each student designed their own plaque based on a family heirloom which was incorporated around the mosaic). As I walked through the school (which was otherwise sterile and depressing, aside from the mosaics) my cousin informed me that in the time since she left the school no longer had funding for math, science and music. After hearing this sad news, I thought about how effective the mosaics were for my own positive psychology, walking through this otherwise dismal environment, and how, for these kids, these collaborative, creative projects must be so beneficial for their own positive psychology, to be able to walk through the halls and see something bright, colorful and imaginative that they contributed to. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s article, therefore, seemed almost like a plea for this sort of influence in communities, schools, families, etc., in that a study of the aspects of positive psychology, in the long run, may benefit our society on a much broader spectrum than we realize.
One study by Kent Berridge et al. focusing on positive psychology investigated “unconscious emotions” in a positive framework. They believed that the cognitive “unconscious” is similar to implicit memory/perception (Kihlstrom) as related to unconscious affective reactions. In the study they showed a series of faces (with the participants given the task of identifying the gender as a means of distraction) with positive, negative, or neutral facial expressions. They tested the subliminal effect by providing the participants with a fruity drink and seeing how much they consumed or wanted to consume. In this test they aimed to determine how unconscious core affective processes are developed, and if they exist at all. What they discovered is that unconscious core effective processes are similar in many ways to conscious core affective processes in that they require a stimulus for elicitation, a reaction direction (positive, negative, or neutral), and they must persist and be expressed later. Unlike conscious core affective processes, however, they are not subjective in reports. They also are caused by an unconscious event. All of these factors are related and applied to what Berridge et al. call a “value-laden event”. This also relates to the distinction made between wanting versus “liking”, and pleasure versus enjoyment. An unconscious emotion can be elicited by applying this “liking” factor to an event, and therefore subliminally attaching the notion that something good is about to happen. In the same sense as “free floating anxiety” (in stressful cases, seen in Ledoux’s studies) a free floating “goodness” also exists, what Berridge calls “the pleasure gloss”.
In general I found this study to be one of the most entertaining we’ve looked at so far, and very insightful. I’m not sure if I understand exactly how the consumption method was effective in measuring the unconscious emotion, especially when thirst is taken into account, but I did find it interesting how something subtle can subconsciously affect your mood. In context to the Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi article, I think this development of the emotional unconscious can be useful in treating cases like depression. It’s exciting to think that sans medication we can be capable of controlling our optimism at all times.
“Entering a new millennium, Americans face a historical choice. Left alone on the pinnacle of economic and political leadership, the United Sates can continue to increase its material wealth while ignoring the human needs of its people and those of the rest of the planet. Such a course is likely to lead to increasing selfishness, to alienation between the more and the less fortunate, and eventually to chaos and despair...Psychology should be able to help document what kinds of families result in children who flourish, what work settings support the greatest satisfaction among workers, what policies result in the strongest civic engagement, and how people’s lives can be most worth living.”
It is fascinating to me that this article was written in January 2000, just before the 2000 presidential election. It seems like this article was almost intended to convey a need for optimism that will be helpful in the future. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s article stresses the importance of working towards a discourse on positive psychology that would benefit our society in the long run, in terms of community, family, education, and so forth. This need stems from the past and current focus on pathology and “damaged” brains instead of putting attention towards the need to develop the positive aspects of our psychological cognitive and unconscious abilities.
On reading this paper, one personal event came to mind. Last weekend I went to Providence for Passover where my aunt lives. One day we took the whole family (all 25 of us) to see these mosaic installations that my aunt did as community projects in my cousin Sophie’s old elementary school (she has done one every year for the past ten years). She works with classes (usually 5th graders) to create mosaic murals based on a general theme and the children’s’ own drawings. For example, one mural showed all the kids favorite places in Providence. Another was about family heirlooms (each student designed their own plaque based on a family heirloom which was incorporated around the mosaic). As I walked through the school (which was otherwise sterile and depressing, aside from the mosaics) my cousin informed me that in the time since she left the school no longer had funding for math, science and music. After hearing this sad news, I thought about how effective the mosaics were for my own positive psychology, walking through this otherwise dismal environment, and how, for these kids, these collaborative, creative projects must be so beneficial for their own positive psychology, to be able to walk through the halls and see something bright, colorful and imaginative that they contributed to. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s article, therefore, seemed almost like a plea for this sort of influence in communities, schools, families, etc., in that a study of the aspects of positive psychology, in the long run, may benefit our society on a much broader spectrum than we realize.
One study by Kent Berridge et al. focusing on positive psychology investigated “unconscious emotions” in a positive framework. They believed that the cognitive “unconscious” is similar to implicit memory/perception (Kihlstrom) as related to unconscious affective reactions. In the study they showed a series of faces (with the participants given the task of identifying the gender as a means of distraction) with positive, negative, or neutral facial expressions. They tested the subliminal effect by providing the participants with a fruity drink and seeing how much they consumed or wanted to consume. In this test they aimed to determine how unconscious core affective processes are developed, and if they exist at all. What they discovered is that unconscious core effective processes are similar in many ways to conscious core affective processes in that they require a stimulus for elicitation, a reaction direction (positive, negative, or neutral), and they must persist and be expressed later. Unlike conscious core affective processes, however, they are not subjective in reports. They also are caused by an unconscious event. All of these factors are related and applied to what Berridge et al. call a “value-laden event”. This also relates to the distinction made between wanting versus “liking”, and pleasure versus enjoyment. An unconscious emotion can be elicited by applying this “liking” factor to an event, and therefore subliminally attaching the notion that something good is about to happen. In the same sense as “free floating anxiety” (in stressful cases, seen in Ledoux’s studies) a free floating “goodness” also exists, what Berridge calls “the pleasure gloss”.
In general I found this study to be one of the most entertaining we’ve looked at so far, and very insightful. I’m not sure if I understand exactly how the consumption method was effective in measuring the unconscious emotion, especially when thirst is taken into account, but I did find it interesting how something subtle can subconsciously affect your mood. In context to the Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi article, I think this development of the emotional unconscious can be useful in treating cases like depression. It’s exciting to think that sans medication we can be capable of controlling our optimism at all times.
Reading Response
Hedonics/Reward
This week’s reading focuses on the mental processes of happiness, core affect of “liking” or “wanting”. Both of these were linked with the question of unconscious or conscious emotion. My main concern was with idea of an unconscious emotion, which I thought was hard to define and the experience of happiness.
The question of unconscious emotion was very striking to me. First of all it appears as though all emotions at one point can become conscious. Indeed because of the importance of feedback in the experience of emotion, it seems impossible for an emotion to be entirely unconscious; it always comes to consciousness some way or another. The only way it could stay unconscious is with subliminal images, which the article uses. In that case, I can understand how the emotion is unconscious and has a result (which is conscious) on one’s emotional experience. How can this translate in life experience? Can we talk about unconscious emotion without using subliminal images? What are some examples of unconscious emotion in everyday experience? How could it be studied? Can
The two positive psychology articles claimed that the positive aspect of our lives and psychology are often neglected or at least are not considered as important as the negative. In other words, we tend to pay more attention to what is not going right than to what is going well. Why do we have trouble seeing the good in things? What would our lives be without happiness? In general it seems as thought people more easily fall into seeing only the negative aspects of things. Why is that? How is it helpful? The author introduces an evolutionary explanation. It is good for us because we can protect ourselves, once again, it is associated with survival but isn’t happiness also good and essential for our survival? In general human beings tend to observe the negative aspects more frequently and easily. What does this question say about our society? Are we scared of what might be positive? Is it because it is easier to complain and find excuses than actually try and be happy? Another concern is that we obviously know what it is like to be too unhappy but can we talk about someone being too happy? And what are the consequences of such a phenomenon? The fact that usually being happy and realistic is opposed also says something about the way we view our lives and society. My next question concerns therapy, and positive psychology. A lot of my friends I have talked to about therapy usually see it as a waist of time and money. The article from positive psychology progress “Empirical Validation of Interventions” seems to think that therapy and psychology should not only be concerned with pathology but also with the positive aspects of our lives and mental health. “… our message is to remind our field that psychology is not just the study of pathology, weakness, and damage; it is also the study of strength and virtue” (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, p7).Can therapy be helpful for everyone? Could it prevent unhappiness or depression rather than just curing it?
In the next article “The Peculiar longevity of Things Not So Bad”, the authors talk about an interesting paradox. This paradox concerns the fact the affect of something not so bad will last longer than something very bad. The affect of something very bad will be stronger but we are able to deal with it in a better way and therefore it won’t stay as long as a strongly negative emotion. Something “not so bad” has a softer direct affect but it lasts longer, we can’t get ride of it as easily. The experiences presented in the article were done with people not knowing each other. I wondered if or how the results would change if something bad happened to someone we knew (and liked) or if someone we knew (and liked) did something to us? Will the fact that we car more influence the strength of the affect and the way one might deal with his or her feelings?
This week’s reading focuses on the mental processes of happiness, core affect of “liking” or “wanting”. Both of these were linked with the question of unconscious or conscious emotion. My main concern was with idea of an unconscious emotion, which I thought was hard to define and the experience of happiness.
The question of unconscious emotion was very striking to me. First of all it appears as though all emotions at one point can become conscious. Indeed because of the importance of feedback in the experience of emotion, it seems impossible for an emotion to be entirely unconscious; it always comes to consciousness some way or another. The only way it could stay unconscious is with subliminal images, which the article uses. In that case, I can understand how the emotion is unconscious and has a result (which is conscious) on one’s emotional experience. How can this translate in life experience? Can we talk about unconscious emotion without using subliminal images? What are some examples of unconscious emotion in everyday experience? How could it be studied? Can
The two positive psychology articles claimed that the positive aspect of our lives and psychology are often neglected or at least are not considered as important as the negative. In other words, we tend to pay more attention to what is not going right than to what is going well. Why do we have trouble seeing the good in things? What would our lives be without happiness? In general it seems as thought people more easily fall into seeing only the negative aspects of things. Why is that? How is it helpful? The author introduces an evolutionary explanation. It is good for us because we can protect ourselves, once again, it is associated with survival but isn’t happiness also good and essential for our survival? In general human beings tend to observe the negative aspects more frequently and easily. What does this question say about our society? Are we scared of what might be positive? Is it because it is easier to complain and find excuses than actually try and be happy? Another concern is that we obviously know what it is like to be too unhappy but can we talk about someone being too happy? And what are the consequences of such a phenomenon? The fact that usually being happy and realistic is opposed also says something about the way we view our lives and society. My next question concerns therapy, and positive psychology. A lot of my friends I have talked to about therapy usually see it as a waist of time and money. The article from positive psychology progress “Empirical Validation of Interventions” seems to think that therapy and psychology should not only be concerned with pathology but also with the positive aspects of our lives and mental health. “… our message is to remind our field that psychology is not just the study of pathology, weakness, and damage; it is also the study of strength and virtue” (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, p7).Can therapy be helpful for everyone? Could it prevent unhappiness or depression rather than just curing it?
In the next article “The Peculiar longevity of Things Not So Bad”, the authors talk about an interesting paradox. This paradox concerns the fact the affect of something not so bad will last longer than something very bad. The affect of something very bad will be stronger but we are able to deal with it in a better way and therefore it won’t stay as long as a strongly negative emotion. Something “not so bad” has a softer direct affect but it lasts longer, we can’t get ride of it as easily. The experiences presented in the article were done with people not knowing each other. I wondered if or how the results would change if something bad happened to someone we knew (and liked) or if someone we knew (and liked) did something to us? Will the fact that we car more influence the strength of the affect and the way one might deal with his or her feelings?
Sunday, April 8, 2007
Positive Psychology and Hedonics
Aiyanna Sezak-Blatt
Hedonics, the please system, and positive psychology was the focus of his week’s reading. From careful distinctions between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, to the more general studies of positive psychology, subjectivity and the processes of the unconscious mind were explored in great depth. Through investigating hedonics and the pleasure system in humans, primates, and rats, research has proven that ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ are different; simple pleasures are indeed not that simply understood. By examining the differences both physically (in the brain) and behaviorally (in actions) ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ are used to more carefully unravel key questions about the subjective unconscious, unconscious emotions (what they really are) and their influence on behavior.
In the article ‘Praising Rewards’, Kent Berridge and Terry Robinson investigate the difference between wanting and liking. The terms are often seen as two side of the same psychological coin. They are viewed as interchangeable and connected words: if you like something than you should want it; if you want it you should like it, however, this isn’t always the case; each term can be analyses on its own. Berridge and Robinson pull apart the process of wanting verses liking by analyzing the components involved in the reward system. The neurobiology of reward is insightful when confronting pathological issues such as addictive behaviors, drug abuse, obsession, and depression. Their article highlights that wanting and liking involve different components of the reward system. The components of wanting are described as incentive salience (a term coined by Berridge and Robinson) motivation, and goal directed plans, verses liking: explicit hedonic feelings— core hedonic impacts—and their implicit affects.
The difference between the two is more clearly contrasted when looking at dopamine’s effect on the pleasure system. Liking is an objective affective reaction. An example of this provided by Berridge and Robinson is that of the liking of taste; “liking for taste involves activity in a distributed neural network that also has been implicated in drug reward. Microinjections of opiod agonists into the accumben shell causes increased facial ‘liking’ reactions to sweetness [the protrusion of the tongue]” (Berridge and Robinson, 2003). A bitter taste provokes it’s own physical reaction, a gaping, opened mouth. The neurotransmitter dopamine, (when either activated or suppressed) does not affect the expression of liking, however it can enhance the sensation of wanting. In humans, “activation of accumbens-striatal dopaminergic systems by amphetamine” correlates with greater subjective wanting. Dopamine manipulation can elicit an increase in wanting of a particular food or drug reward without affecting the subjective ratings of pleasure or liking. As Berridge states in his second article, ‘Simple Pleasures’, “Dopamine systems seem unable to cause a pleasure gloss. Liking reactions to sweetness persist unchanged and normal, no matter what brain dopamine systems are doing” (Berridge, 2004).
To make a more clear distinction between wanting and liking, Berridge describes a case study where the incentive salience wanting is stimulated without hedonic ‘liking’. This is a case described under ‘False Pleasure Electrodes’, where a female patient was implanted with an electrode that stimulates the pleasure system. This patient claimed that the electrode stimulated a strong desire for liquids; it stimulated erotic feelings (sexual stimulation without an orgasm), and the desire to stimulate the electrode again, and again. When stimulated, she drank “copiously”, recorded hot and cold sensations and levels of high anxiety. She began to stimulate the electrode throughout the day at home often neglecting her own hygiene and social engagements (Berridge, 2004). This case illustrates a desire to self-stimulate even though no desirable or pleasurable sensations were occurring. Berridge showed that this patient experienced the incentive salience of ‘wanting’ (to self-stimulate) without hedonic ‘liking’ of the feeling produced by the stimulus itself. In this case, stimulation became an addiction in and of itself.
From this fascinating distinction, Berridge and his collogue Piotr Winkielman examine the possible effects of unconscious ‘liking’ in our emotional states and in our behavior. In their article, ‘What is an unconscious emotion?’ they argue that subconscious ‘liking’ can influence emotional states and behavioral decisions. Their article describes an experiment in which subliminal images unconsciously changed either the participant’s preferences for an image or their consumption of fruit juice offered throughout the experiment. In this study individuals were shown images of Chinese ideographs followed by subliminal exposures of a happy, neutral, or angry facial expression. There was also a second layer to this experiment, participants were able to pour themselves and consume glasses of sweet juice throughout the experiment. Their finding showed that subliminal facial stimuli significantly affected the participants. Negative subliminal images resulted in less beverage consumption, and/or affected the participant’s conscious emotional states. Berridge and Winkielman demonstrated that both positive affect as well as negative affect could unconsciously influence the behavior and/or emotional state of individual participants.
This study gives a new meaning to the notion of unconscious emotional experiences, arguing that “In normal adults under some conditions, core ‘liking’ reactions may influence a person’s consumption behavior later, without a person being able to report subjective awareness of the affective reaction at the moment it was caused. When the brain generates an affective response of which the mind is unaware, as we have described here, there exists a truly unconscious emotion” (Berridge and Winkielman, 2003). The subtle distinctions made in these articles (liking verses wanting, and the influence of unconscious stimuli on emotion) reiterate the role that feelings play in our behavioral preferences and decisions. Simple feelings are actually very complex, and our conscious decisions can be influenced by truly unconscious preferences. The subjective assessment of our emotional states is a conscious process that can be affected by unconsciously perceived stimuli.
The next issue that this week’s reading focused on was that of subjective experience and subjective emotional processing. Positive psychology is a field that focuses on channeling individual strength and enhancing the feeling of worth and happiness. The scope of the two articles focusing on positive emotions, ‘Positive Psychology: An Introduction’ and Positive Psychology Progress: Empirical Validation of Interviews’ were large: suggesting that individual changes and increased happiness on an individual level could change the collective state of our future as a nation. However large the scope, they might be right. Positive psychology looks to the average, ‘normal’ person with the intention of bettering one’s emotional well-being. One of the most fascinating aspects of these articles was their definition of subjective. Martin Seligman, Nansook Park, and Christopher Peterson argue that the individual defines a subjective emotion. Happiness, for example, is what one defines it as. A central issue in this work is how a person’s “values and goals mediate between external events and the quality of experience.” Positive psychologists look to enhance one’s ability to cope, to find joy, and ultimately to mediate and define their own happiness.
These articles argue that an individual can consciously shape their sense of well-being, and with time, enhance their own sense of fulfillment. Because subjectivity exists on an individual level, I found these article practically interesting. They focus not on what’s gone wrong, but what can be strengthened in everyone.
Another interesting point in Seligman, Park, and Peterson’s work, was that of optimism. They suggest that an optimistic attitude towards daily activities and even in severe illnesses such as AIDS, can lead to better health, and even slow the symptoms of disease. Though the articles were a bit on the idealistic side, they prove a significant point: individuals can, to some extent, cognitively transform their subjective states, and can consciously work to enhance well-being.
Our emotional states are complex, they can be influenced by unconsciously perceived stimuli, and they can are subjectively represented. This week’s reading emphasized that the feeling brain has many layers, including processes that we are not aware of and processes that are conscious and cognitively processed. Emotions are three dimensional, and all of these factors influence even the most basic of feelings.
Aiyanna Sezak-Blatt
Hedonics, the please system, and positive psychology was the focus of his week’s reading. From careful distinctions between ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’, to the more general studies of positive psychology, subjectivity and the processes of the unconscious mind were explored in great depth. Through investigating hedonics and the pleasure system in humans, primates, and rats, research has proven that ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ are different; simple pleasures are indeed not that simply understood. By examining the differences both physically (in the brain) and behaviorally (in actions) ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ are used to more carefully unravel key questions about the subjective unconscious, unconscious emotions (what they really are) and their influence on behavior.
In the article ‘Praising Rewards’, Kent Berridge and Terry Robinson investigate the difference between wanting and liking. The terms are often seen as two side of the same psychological coin. They are viewed as interchangeable and connected words: if you like something than you should want it; if you want it you should like it, however, this isn’t always the case; each term can be analyses on its own. Berridge and Robinson pull apart the process of wanting verses liking by analyzing the components involved in the reward system. The neurobiology of reward is insightful when confronting pathological issues such as addictive behaviors, drug abuse, obsession, and depression. Their article highlights that wanting and liking involve different components of the reward system. The components of wanting are described as incentive salience (a term coined by Berridge and Robinson) motivation, and goal directed plans, verses liking: explicit hedonic feelings— core hedonic impacts—and their implicit affects.
The difference between the two is more clearly contrasted when looking at dopamine’s effect on the pleasure system. Liking is an objective affective reaction. An example of this provided by Berridge and Robinson is that of the liking of taste; “liking for taste involves activity in a distributed neural network that also has been implicated in drug reward. Microinjections of opiod agonists into the accumben shell causes increased facial ‘liking’ reactions to sweetness [the protrusion of the tongue]” (Berridge and Robinson, 2003). A bitter taste provokes it’s own physical reaction, a gaping, opened mouth. The neurotransmitter dopamine, (when either activated or suppressed) does not affect the expression of liking, however it can enhance the sensation of wanting. In humans, “activation of accumbens-striatal dopaminergic systems by amphetamine” correlates with greater subjective wanting. Dopamine manipulation can elicit an increase in wanting of a particular food or drug reward without affecting the subjective ratings of pleasure or liking. As Berridge states in his second article, ‘Simple Pleasures’, “Dopamine systems seem unable to cause a pleasure gloss. Liking reactions to sweetness persist unchanged and normal, no matter what brain dopamine systems are doing” (Berridge, 2004).
To make a more clear distinction between wanting and liking, Berridge describes a case study where the incentive salience wanting is stimulated without hedonic ‘liking’. This is a case described under ‘False Pleasure Electrodes’, where a female patient was implanted with an electrode that stimulates the pleasure system. This patient claimed that the electrode stimulated a strong desire for liquids; it stimulated erotic feelings (sexual stimulation without an orgasm), and the desire to stimulate the electrode again, and again. When stimulated, she drank “copiously”, recorded hot and cold sensations and levels of high anxiety. She began to stimulate the electrode throughout the day at home often neglecting her own hygiene and social engagements (Berridge, 2004). This case illustrates a desire to self-stimulate even though no desirable or pleasurable sensations were occurring. Berridge showed that this patient experienced the incentive salience of ‘wanting’ (to self-stimulate) without hedonic ‘liking’ of the feeling produced by the stimulus itself. In this case, stimulation became an addiction in and of itself.
From this fascinating distinction, Berridge and his collogue Piotr Winkielman examine the possible effects of unconscious ‘liking’ in our emotional states and in our behavior. In their article, ‘What is an unconscious emotion?’ they argue that subconscious ‘liking’ can influence emotional states and behavioral decisions. Their article describes an experiment in which subliminal images unconsciously changed either the participant’s preferences for an image or their consumption of fruit juice offered throughout the experiment. In this study individuals were shown images of Chinese ideographs followed by subliminal exposures of a happy, neutral, or angry facial expression. There was also a second layer to this experiment, participants were able to pour themselves and consume glasses of sweet juice throughout the experiment. Their finding showed that subliminal facial stimuli significantly affected the participants. Negative subliminal images resulted in less beverage consumption, and/or affected the participant’s conscious emotional states. Berridge and Winkielman demonstrated that both positive affect as well as negative affect could unconsciously influence the behavior and/or emotional state of individual participants.
This study gives a new meaning to the notion of unconscious emotional experiences, arguing that “In normal adults under some conditions, core ‘liking’ reactions may influence a person’s consumption behavior later, without a person being able to report subjective awareness of the affective reaction at the moment it was caused. When the brain generates an affective response of which the mind is unaware, as we have described here, there exists a truly unconscious emotion” (Berridge and Winkielman, 2003). The subtle distinctions made in these articles (liking verses wanting, and the influence of unconscious stimuli on emotion) reiterate the role that feelings play in our behavioral preferences and decisions. Simple feelings are actually very complex, and our conscious decisions can be influenced by truly unconscious preferences. The subjective assessment of our emotional states is a conscious process that can be affected by unconsciously perceived stimuli.
The next issue that this week’s reading focused on was that of subjective experience and subjective emotional processing. Positive psychology is a field that focuses on channeling individual strength and enhancing the feeling of worth and happiness. The scope of the two articles focusing on positive emotions, ‘Positive Psychology: An Introduction’ and Positive Psychology Progress: Empirical Validation of Interviews’ were large: suggesting that individual changes and increased happiness on an individual level could change the collective state of our future as a nation. However large the scope, they might be right. Positive psychology looks to the average, ‘normal’ person with the intention of bettering one’s emotional well-being. One of the most fascinating aspects of these articles was their definition of subjective. Martin Seligman, Nansook Park, and Christopher Peterson argue that the individual defines a subjective emotion. Happiness, for example, is what one defines it as. A central issue in this work is how a person’s “values and goals mediate between external events and the quality of experience.” Positive psychologists look to enhance one’s ability to cope, to find joy, and ultimately to mediate and define their own happiness.
These articles argue that an individual can consciously shape their sense of well-being, and with time, enhance their own sense of fulfillment. Because subjectivity exists on an individual level, I found these article practically interesting. They focus not on what’s gone wrong, but what can be strengthened in everyone.
Another interesting point in Seligman, Park, and Peterson’s work, was that of optimism. They suggest that an optimistic attitude towards daily activities and even in severe illnesses such as AIDS, can lead to better health, and even slow the symptoms of disease. Though the articles were a bit on the idealistic side, they prove a significant point: individuals can, to some extent, cognitively transform their subjective states, and can consciously work to enhance well-being.
Our emotional states are complex, they can be influenced by unconsciously perceived stimuli, and they can are subjectively represented. This week’s reading emphasized that the feeling brain has many layers, including processes that we are not aware of and processes that are conscious and cognitively processed. Emotions are three dimensional, and all of these factors influence even the most basic of feelings.
The [In]Existence? of Unconscious Emotions
This week’s readings discussed the definition, neural processes and various brain structures involved with hedonics/reward. Additionally, the papers attempted to differentiate between conscious and unconscious emotions.
In any scientific field, but especially psychology, members often become so transfixed by popular schools of thought or the latest controversial ideas that they can forget the actual purpose of the discipline: to help people. This made Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s description of “positive psychology," the study of positive emotions, characters and institutions, especially refreshing. It forced me to focus not only on how the concepts discussed in class affect people, but how to utilize recently acquired findings to improve people’s psychical and psychological health and overall quality of life. The articles also noted people’s tendency, which is all too apparent in the popular subjects of current psychological research, to focus almost exclusively on negative ideas. The authors predictably assumed the evolutionary perspective noting that our tendency to focus more on potential problems stems from our innate need for self-preservation, which is much more likely to be affected by something negative, like a hungry predator or violent competitor for resources.
In “The Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad,” the authors noted how the effect of mildly negative stimuli is actually worse than that of severely negative ones. We know that our brains are specially programmed to process tragedies, but this article explained that milder tragedies or “things not so bad” are not processed the same way, which explains why the effects of supposedly milder negative stimuli can potentially last so much longer.
But the most interesting and contentious articles this week concerned the potential existence of unconscious emotions. I admit that after weeks of attempting to accept that emotions are, for the most part, predictable responses and therefore largely controllable, I initially found Berridge’s various articles refreshing. However, I was ultimately unconvinced of the existence of unconscious emotions.
In “What is an unconscious emotions?: (The case for unconscious ‘liking’),” Berridge and Winkielman attempt to modify William Jame’s classic definition of emotion as “the conscious experience or subjective feeling of emotion” to include those experienced on an unconscious level. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 181–182) I agree that both positive and negative emotions can be elicited by subliminal (i.e. unconsciously recognized) stimuli, for example, the negligible exposure to various facial expressions. I also agree that this unconscious recognition can dramatically influence an individual’s behavior, decisions and opinions, as proven by the subjects’ consequentially influenced appraisal and consumption of the beverage. However, I feel that both the unconscious recognition of emotionally charged stimuli and the resulting influence on behavior are the result of previously proven existent unconscious cognitive processes, like implicit memory and implicit perception, rather than an unconscious emotional experience. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) I agree with Clore who argues that, “ . . . it is not possible to have an unconscious emotion because emotion involves an experience, and one cannot have an experience that is not experienced . . . emotions cannot be unconscious because they must be felt, and feelings are by definition conscious. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 183)
I felt that Berridge et al largely missed the point in their attempt to define and prove, or at least provide evidence for, the existence of unconscious emotion. Firstly, their definition for unconscious or “’implicit emotion refers to the changes in experience, thought or action that are attributed to one’s emotional state, independent of his or her conscious awareness of that state” is significantly flawed. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) Unconscious emotion refers only to a change in experience. Any resulting “changes in thought or action” are merely effects of this presumed emotional state, but not the state itself. A smile is not happiness itself, only the result of it. They elaborate further by citing “inaccurate labeling of the exact nature of one’s emotion, as when one angrily denies that one is angry” in addition to “errors of attention, as when one realizes only later that one has been gripped by an emotional experience at an earlier time.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) However, the authors are forced to admit that individuals in such cases are still “fully conscious of the events that cause the emotion, and one may be conscious of the many effects of emotion. Moreover, the actual emotional state is presumed capable of being made conscious if only the person’s full attention is directed to the emotional experience, and the right label is provided. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) They admit that the unconscious emotional experience or “truly implicit affect would require the demonstration of an affective reaction of which one was simply not aware, even upon introspection.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) As such, the existence of implicit emotions is ultimately impossible to prove, regardless of what may be construed as supporting evidence from observed behavioral responses. To conclude, the initial stimulus or reason behind an emotional experience can be unconscious, however, the actual emotional experience, not to be confused with any resulting changes in thought or behavior, is a subjective feeling or experiences and therefore intrinsically conscious.
In any scientific field, but especially psychology, members often become so transfixed by popular schools of thought or the latest controversial ideas that they can forget the actual purpose of the discipline: to help people. This made Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s description of “positive psychology," the study of positive emotions, characters and institutions, especially refreshing. It forced me to focus not only on how the concepts discussed in class affect people, but how to utilize recently acquired findings to improve people’s psychical and psychological health and overall quality of life. The articles also noted people’s tendency, which is all too apparent in the popular subjects of current psychological research, to focus almost exclusively on negative ideas. The authors predictably assumed the evolutionary perspective noting that our tendency to focus more on potential problems stems from our innate need for self-preservation, which is much more likely to be affected by something negative, like a hungry predator or violent competitor for resources.
In “The Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad,” the authors noted how the effect of mildly negative stimuli is actually worse than that of severely negative ones. We know that our brains are specially programmed to process tragedies, but this article explained that milder tragedies or “things not so bad” are not processed the same way, which explains why the effects of supposedly milder negative stimuli can potentially last so much longer.
But the most interesting and contentious articles this week concerned the potential existence of unconscious emotions. I admit that after weeks of attempting to accept that emotions are, for the most part, predictable responses and therefore largely controllable, I initially found Berridge’s various articles refreshing. However, I was ultimately unconvinced of the existence of unconscious emotions.
In “What is an unconscious emotions?: (The case for unconscious ‘liking’),” Berridge and Winkielman attempt to modify William Jame’s classic definition of emotion as “the conscious experience or subjective feeling of emotion” to include those experienced on an unconscious level. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 181–182) I agree that both positive and negative emotions can be elicited by subliminal (i.e. unconsciously recognized) stimuli, for example, the negligible exposure to various facial expressions. I also agree that this unconscious recognition can dramatically influence an individual’s behavior, decisions and opinions, as proven by the subjects’ consequentially influenced appraisal and consumption of the beverage. However, I feel that both the unconscious recognition of emotionally charged stimuli and the resulting influence on behavior are the result of previously proven existent unconscious cognitive processes, like implicit memory and implicit perception, rather than an unconscious emotional experience. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) I agree with Clore who argues that, “ . . . it is not possible to have an unconscious emotion because emotion involves an experience, and one cannot have an experience that is not experienced . . . emotions cannot be unconscious because they must be felt, and feelings are by definition conscious. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 183)
I felt that Berridge et al largely missed the point in their attempt to define and prove, or at least provide evidence for, the existence of unconscious emotion. Firstly, their definition for unconscious or “’implicit emotion refers to the changes in experience, thought or action that are attributed to one’s emotional state, independent of his or her conscious awareness of that state” is significantly flawed. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) Unconscious emotion refers only to a change in experience. Any resulting “changes in thought or action” are merely effects of this presumed emotional state, but not the state itself. A smile is not happiness itself, only the result of it. They elaborate further by citing “inaccurate labeling of the exact nature of one’s emotion, as when one angrily denies that one is angry” in addition to “errors of attention, as when one realizes only later that one has been gripped by an emotional experience at an earlier time.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) However, the authors are forced to admit that individuals in such cases are still “fully conscious of the events that cause the emotion, and one may be conscious of the many effects of emotion. Moreover, the actual emotional state is presumed capable of being made conscious if only the person’s full attention is directed to the emotional experience, and the right label is provided. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) They admit that the unconscious emotional experience or “truly implicit affect would require the demonstration of an affective reaction of which one was simply not aware, even upon introspection.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) As such, the existence of implicit emotions is ultimately impossible to prove, regardless of what may be construed as supporting evidence from observed behavioral responses. To conclude, the initial stimulus or reason behind an emotional experience can be unconscious, however, the actual emotional experience, not to be confused with any resulting changes in thought or behavior, is a subjective feeling or experiences and therefore intrinsically conscious.
Tuesday, April 3, 2007
Decision-Making and Neuroeconomics
This week’s readings all involve decision-making. In his last chapter, Damasio discusses Descartes’ error and the meaning of the book's title. He states that beings were beings long before humanity emerged; therefore an organism must first exist and “be” before it can think. As Damasio says, “We are, and then we think, and we think only inasmuch as we are, since thinking is indeed caused by structures and operations of being,” (248). Furthermore, the body and the mind, emotion and reason, are not necessarily separate entities and are integrated processes. Thus, in decision-making, the body and the mind, from emotion to reason, to neural/cell biology, are all interconnected.
Damasio discusses the differences in decision-making in frontal-lobe damage individuals, brain damage patients with lesions other than the frontal lobe, and “normals”.‘Normals’ and patients with brain damage that did not affect the frontal lobe, demonstrated high skin conductance responses to the high-arousal slides, whereas frontal lobe patients showed no skin conductance responses. When asked to debrief, frontal lobe patients had the ability to articulate the high-emotional content of the picture and when the picture was shown. In other words, they knew that the “in spite of realizing their content ought to be disturbing, he himself was not disturbed…the patients could evoke factual knowledge internally but could not produce a somatic state” (211). They knew how they were supposed to feel, but could not feel the appropriate reaction.
The next way that they tested the somatic-marker hypothesis were through gambling experiments, in which they tested frontal lobe patients and ‘normals’ in decision-making drills with real-life uncertainty and circumstances. The objective of the experiment was to lose as little as possible and gain as much as possible. Inherit human biases we have are preference of reward over punishment, gain over loss, and low-risk over high-risk. All ‘normal’ patients were generally picked from decks C and D after ‘learning’ that A and B were risky. Despite smaller gains, these players assumed that Decks C and D would reap higher benefits in the long run. In the cases of Elliot, even though they considered themselves ‘low-risk’, they were bankrupt midway through the game, thus demonstrating the biases and inaccuracy of verbal accounts. Although there was concrete evidence that decks A and B were ‘dangerous,’ and ‘disadvantageous,’ frontal-lobe damage patients continuously became bankrupt because they were insensitive to the long-term affects and acted out of immediate gratification. While ‘normals’ sought out patterns to predict a bad outcome, the neural underpinnings that determined what was wise to avoid/prefer were malfunctioning in frontal lobe patients. ‘Normals’ “place a disappropriate weight on losses relative to gains of similar absolute value,” (Neuroeconomics, 112).
A field called Neuroeconomics has emerged in recent years, combining psychological, neurological and economic studies to more accurately and predictably determine how people make and value choices and decisions. In attempting to understand human (consumer) behavior, economists and neuroscientists alike have assessed that “behavior can be interpreted as choosing alternatives with the goal of maximizing utility,” (Neuroeconomics, 108).
Numerous hormones, neurotransmitters and brain areas are involved in decision-making.The ACC not only responds to positive rewards, but to negative rewards and utility as well, taking into account errors, negative response, pain and penalty. In making decisions, neural systems involved are sensitive to relative gains and loses. Frontal lobe patients, however, are not sensitive to these relative gains and loses.
In Demasio’s experiments, frontal lobe patients were unable to make advantageous decisions for the future because of a lack of working memory and attention and a neural inability to determine a pattern of losses vs. gains. Out of myopia for the future, these patients acted for the ‘now’ rather than the future. Frontal lobe patients did not have the basic skill of planning for future prospects rather than immediate gains. This may be a result of poor working memory or attention, or somatic-markers, whereby future scenarios are not taken into consideration. With failure of the somatic-marker, it is impossible to develop ‘theory-of-mind’ or other such processes important in guiding for the future. How they acted in this game was in direct proportion to how they acted in real life, and their inability to plan ahead.
Dopamine also plays a large role in reward. It “plays a crucial role in value assessment by signaling errors in reward prediction, which are used to augment reward-producing behaviors both by generating learning signals and by adaptively updating goal states and attentional focus in working memory,” (Neuroeconomics, 110).
In the Ultimatum Game, individuals were asked to either accept or reject a sum of money from another player. In typical economic models, individuals would have taken money every time in the Ultimatum Game, since humans prefer inherently rewards. However, half of the unfair offers were rejected. In unfair offers, the dlPFC and the anterior insula lit up when participants were faced with an unfair offer. These areas are associated with deliberative and emotional processes, “if the insular activation was greater than the dlPFC activation, participants tended to reject the offer, if the dlPFC activation was greater, they tended to accept the offer.” Unfair choices elicited disgust and pain. Participants tended to act with trust and under the ‘norm’. These actions were chosen because they elicit social rewards when acted out in the real world. The dlPFC is also involved in “perceptual evidence for decision-making,” (Rorie & Newsome, 42). Sensory evidence is more active when the pictures were clearer and the task easier. Likewise, attention is more required in the more difficult tasks. Like Damasio points out, visual representations and attention are crucial in decision making.
As Grimes and all of the readings commonly state, our brains, evolutionarily, have been made to suit co-habitation with others. He says, while we may have “Machiavellian interests,” we benefit by our biological urges to be cooperative and trustful. Social interactions, love, sex, and many other things trigger the production of oxytocin, a necessary hormone that acts through the parasympathetic nervous system. This hormone goes through parts of the brain associated with memory, the limbic system, prefrontal cortex, memory and decision-making sections. Oxytocin, amongst many other things, has a large role in trustworthiness. Trusting is socially advantageous. Thus, the economic viewpoint that assumes we are only interested in maximizing personal gains is not advantageous. Zak suggests that social cooperation is a ‘primitive’ impulse, whereas greed is only evident in more newly-evolved brain parts. Cooperation involves sophisticated processes such as ‘theory of mind,’ ‘delayed gratification’ ‘attention,’ that frontal lobe patients often lack. Trust, however, does not just entail controlled responses, but involves emotional response. In any case, those who opted to trust usually came out better in the long run.
As Lehrer assesses, “In the real world, losing out in the short term could mean getting a social benefit in the long term,” (502). Although there are specific brain areas involved in mechanism for decision-making, all the readings suggest that there is no one single brain area that determines decision-making. Instead, there are multiple neural processes involved in decision-making. Reward-based decisions are complex, usually come in different modalities, and are time-dependant. When thinking about a future reward, McClure states, brain areas associated with rationality are activated, whereas when it is an immediate reward, emotional circuits become activated. Activity in the brain was directly reflective of what the participants chose.
Damasio and Sanfey and co. say, controlled and automatic processes are not two distinct processes, but rather are a continuum. Although automatic processes jump in to make decision at first, controlled processes then mitigate it when the consequences of using solely the automatic processes becomes too large. Though these systems cooperate, they, at times, compete and do have distinguishable brain lateralization. Just as Damasio states, Sanfey says, automatic/emotional processes are usually hard-wired and involve evolutionarily ‘older’ parts of the brain (posterior cortical structures & subcortical systems, limbic system), whereas controlled processes involve ‘newer’ parts of the brain (anterior and dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex), and are flexible and do not rely on specific mechanisms. Those with frontal lobe damage often lack the basic planning skills because areas involved with higher thinking, problem-solving and planning are localized in the ‘controlled’ processes systems, thereby allowing the ‘automatic’ system take over each time.
Economists have now attempted to integrate the dual-process model. However, Camerer (from Lehrer’s article) says that it remains controversial: too dichotomizing for neuroscientists and too complicated for economists. Neuroeconomics however attempts to bridge the gap. More often than not, Lehrer says, new do not make decisions advantageous to our future, which is why “US consumers currently have a savings rate close to zero…” arguing that, “understanding how we make such decisions will help us develop better economic policies,” (504).
The fact is, economics and marketing do not have our savings rates in mind. In fact, their goal is to bankrupt us and to make us dependant on loans and buy more products. It is advantageous to marketers for consumers to put the future on the backburner and to bank on the present. In an ideal society for the marketer, we would all be Elliots, without the ability to plan for the future. If we always thought about our retirement or savings, brand names would go bankrupt. Labels are ingrained in our minds and influence our every day decisions, as is evident in the Pepsi-taste test, where brand always trumped taste. When drinking a cola with a Coke label, the hippocampus and the midbrain were lit up, just like when we see other brands.
The field of neuromarketing, more so than looking out for our best interest, will use psychological/neurological studies in order to better understand how to manipulate our decisions and enable us to buy their products more predictably. Advertisers are now banking on fMRI scans (rather than outdated methods of verbal accounts) to determine consumer choice and behavior, as in FKF with the Super bowl ads. For an advertisement to be successful, reward sections of the brain must be activated. The merging of these fields is very exciting, but highly manipulative.
Damasio discusses the differences in decision-making in frontal-lobe damage individuals, brain damage patients with lesions other than the frontal lobe, and “normals”.‘Normals’ and patients with brain damage that did not affect the frontal lobe, demonstrated high skin conductance responses to the high-arousal slides, whereas frontal lobe patients showed no skin conductance responses. When asked to debrief, frontal lobe patients had the ability to articulate the high-emotional content of the picture and when the picture was shown. In other words, they knew that the “in spite of realizing their content ought to be disturbing, he himself was not disturbed…the patients could evoke factual knowledge internally but could not produce a somatic state” (211). They knew how they were supposed to feel, but could not feel the appropriate reaction.
The next way that they tested the somatic-marker hypothesis were through gambling experiments, in which they tested frontal lobe patients and ‘normals’ in decision-making drills with real-life uncertainty and circumstances. The objective of the experiment was to lose as little as possible and gain as much as possible. Inherit human biases we have are preference of reward over punishment, gain over loss, and low-risk over high-risk. All ‘normal’ patients were generally picked from decks C and D after ‘learning’ that A and B were risky. Despite smaller gains, these players assumed that Decks C and D would reap higher benefits in the long run. In the cases of Elliot, even though they considered themselves ‘low-risk’, they were bankrupt midway through the game, thus demonstrating the biases and inaccuracy of verbal accounts. Although there was concrete evidence that decks A and B were ‘dangerous,’ and ‘disadvantageous,’ frontal-lobe damage patients continuously became bankrupt because they were insensitive to the long-term affects and acted out of immediate gratification. While ‘normals’ sought out patterns to predict a bad outcome, the neural underpinnings that determined what was wise to avoid/prefer were malfunctioning in frontal lobe patients. ‘Normals’ “place a disappropriate weight on losses relative to gains of similar absolute value,” (Neuroeconomics, 112).
A field called Neuroeconomics has emerged in recent years, combining psychological, neurological and economic studies to more accurately and predictably determine how people make and value choices and decisions. In attempting to understand human (consumer) behavior, economists and neuroscientists alike have assessed that “behavior can be interpreted as choosing alternatives with the goal of maximizing utility,” (Neuroeconomics, 108).
Numerous hormones, neurotransmitters and brain areas are involved in decision-making.The ACC not only responds to positive rewards, but to negative rewards and utility as well, taking into account errors, negative response, pain and penalty. In making decisions, neural systems involved are sensitive to relative gains and loses. Frontal lobe patients, however, are not sensitive to these relative gains and loses.
In Demasio’s experiments, frontal lobe patients were unable to make advantageous decisions for the future because of a lack of working memory and attention and a neural inability to determine a pattern of losses vs. gains. Out of myopia for the future, these patients acted for the ‘now’ rather than the future. Frontal lobe patients did not have the basic skill of planning for future prospects rather than immediate gains. This may be a result of poor working memory or attention, or somatic-markers, whereby future scenarios are not taken into consideration. With failure of the somatic-marker, it is impossible to develop ‘theory-of-mind’ or other such processes important in guiding for the future. How they acted in this game was in direct proportion to how they acted in real life, and their inability to plan ahead.
Dopamine also plays a large role in reward. It “plays a crucial role in value assessment by signaling errors in reward prediction, which are used to augment reward-producing behaviors both by generating learning signals and by adaptively updating goal states and attentional focus in working memory,” (Neuroeconomics, 110).
In the Ultimatum Game, individuals were asked to either accept or reject a sum of money from another player. In typical economic models, individuals would have taken money every time in the Ultimatum Game, since humans prefer inherently rewards. However, half of the unfair offers were rejected. In unfair offers, the dlPFC and the anterior insula lit up when participants were faced with an unfair offer. These areas are associated with deliberative and emotional processes, “if the insular activation was greater than the dlPFC activation, participants tended to reject the offer, if the dlPFC activation was greater, they tended to accept the offer.” Unfair choices elicited disgust and pain. Participants tended to act with trust and under the ‘norm’. These actions were chosen because they elicit social rewards when acted out in the real world. The dlPFC is also involved in “perceptual evidence for decision-making,” (Rorie & Newsome, 42). Sensory evidence is more active when the pictures were clearer and the task easier. Likewise, attention is more required in the more difficult tasks. Like Damasio points out, visual representations and attention are crucial in decision making.
As Grimes and all of the readings commonly state, our brains, evolutionarily, have been made to suit co-habitation with others. He says, while we may have “Machiavellian interests,” we benefit by our biological urges to be cooperative and trustful. Social interactions, love, sex, and many other things trigger the production of oxytocin, a necessary hormone that acts through the parasympathetic nervous system. This hormone goes through parts of the brain associated with memory, the limbic system, prefrontal cortex, memory and decision-making sections. Oxytocin, amongst many other things, has a large role in trustworthiness. Trusting is socially advantageous. Thus, the economic viewpoint that assumes we are only interested in maximizing personal gains is not advantageous. Zak suggests that social cooperation is a ‘primitive’ impulse, whereas greed is only evident in more newly-evolved brain parts. Cooperation involves sophisticated processes such as ‘theory of mind,’ ‘delayed gratification’ ‘attention,’ that frontal lobe patients often lack. Trust, however, does not just entail controlled responses, but involves emotional response. In any case, those who opted to trust usually came out better in the long run.
As Lehrer assesses, “In the real world, losing out in the short term could mean getting a social benefit in the long term,” (502). Although there are specific brain areas involved in mechanism for decision-making, all the readings suggest that there is no one single brain area that determines decision-making. Instead, there are multiple neural processes involved in decision-making. Reward-based decisions are complex, usually come in different modalities, and are time-dependant. When thinking about a future reward, McClure states, brain areas associated with rationality are activated, whereas when it is an immediate reward, emotional circuits become activated. Activity in the brain was directly reflective of what the participants chose.
Damasio and Sanfey and co. say, controlled and automatic processes are not two distinct processes, but rather are a continuum. Although automatic processes jump in to make decision at first, controlled processes then mitigate it when the consequences of using solely the automatic processes becomes too large. Though these systems cooperate, they, at times, compete and do have distinguishable brain lateralization. Just as Damasio states, Sanfey says, automatic/emotional processes are usually hard-wired and involve evolutionarily ‘older’ parts of the brain (posterior cortical structures & subcortical systems, limbic system), whereas controlled processes involve ‘newer’ parts of the brain (anterior and dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex), and are flexible and do not rely on specific mechanisms. Those with frontal lobe damage often lack the basic planning skills because areas involved with higher thinking, problem-solving and planning are localized in the ‘controlled’ processes systems, thereby allowing the ‘automatic’ system take over each time.
Economists have now attempted to integrate the dual-process model. However, Camerer (from Lehrer’s article) says that it remains controversial: too dichotomizing for neuroscientists and too complicated for economists. Neuroeconomics however attempts to bridge the gap. More often than not, Lehrer says, new do not make decisions advantageous to our future, which is why “US consumers currently have a savings rate close to zero…” arguing that, “understanding how we make such decisions will help us develop better economic policies,” (504).
The fact is, economics and marketing do not have our savings rates in mind. In fact, their goal is to bankrupt us and to make us dependant on loans and buy more products. It is advantageous to marketers for consumers to put the future on the backburner and to bank on the present. In an ideal society for the marketer, we would all be Elliots, without the ability to plan for the future. If we always thought about our retirement or savings, brand names would go bankrupt. Labels are ingrained in our minds and influence our every day decisions, as is evident in the Pepsi-taste test, where brand always trumped taste. When drinking a cola with a Coke label, the hippocampus and the midbrain were lit up, just like when we see other brands.
The field of neuromarketing, more so than looking out for our best interest, will use psychological/neurological studies in order to better understand how to manipulate our decisions and enable us to buy their products more predictably. Advertisers are now banking on fMRI scans (rather than outdated methods of verbal accounts) to determine consumer choice and behavior, as in FKF with the Super bowl ads. For an advertisement to be successful, reward sections of the brain must be activated. The merging of these fields is very exciting, but highly manipulative.
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