Bettina Barbier
The Feeling Brain
How Do Emotions Develop?
The articles for this week deal mainly with how a growing child’s mind and emotions develop and what kinds of things influence that development.
At issue in asking how mind and emotions develop along with a growing child are several separate areas of inquiry: first, how does the primary, tangible substrate for those emotions develop, by which is meant the physical brain itself; second, how and from what does the mind by which the emotions are expressed arise, and thirdly, how do the emotions themselves come to be?
Daniel Siegel begins his analysis of the development of the mind with the physical brain. He relates the development of the child’s brain to the mind of the parent or caregiver, in a process where non-physical and non-genetic elements and processes actually, in some ways, give rise to the physical brain.
Siegel uses a sculptural metaphor to set forth his conception of the process of physical development and non-physical influence upon it. In “experience-expectant” development, he says, neuronal material develops, made up of neurons and synapses, a kind of un-carved block of material from which experience will sculpt – literally and physically – the final compliment of neurons and neuronal connections, and the layout of the brain. This sculpting process gives rise to the substrate upon which further development will occur throughout the lifespan of the individual. (Siegel, 72.)
The gist of the argument at this point is that proper attachment to caregivers will foster the healthy development of the brain, mind, and emotions, but that improper attachment will not: “Disuse (“use-it-or-lose-it”) or toxic conditions, such as with excessive stress (as in child abuse) can lead to the elimination of existing synapses” (72). He introduces another concept, that of “experience-dependant” development, in which new neural connections are made through experience. In this he offers hope for those who did not receive the quality of connection that he lays out as necessary to develop certain brain structures and mind qualities, saying that “ . . . this period may not be the “last chance” for ongoing development in these areas . . . “ (73) even while making it clear that “ . . . it is a time when basic circuitry is being established for the first time” (73). So proper connection is privileged above later experience, but if it is not gotten, at least all is not lost.
In calling attention to child-rearing practices in which children are “bombard[ed] . . . with excessive sensory stimulation in hopes of making better brains” (72), Seigel weighs in with a well-argued if lengthy position on the issue of quantity versus quality in terms of communication with the developing child. Clearly, quality wins.
Like others we have read, Siegel closely examines areas of the brain and relates them to discrete elements of function, and he synthesizes several researchers’ work into support for his own theory of neuronal integration. As many have done, he takes great pains to locate the brain in the body, and refers to the element of connection to the rest of the body as an essential part of what he calls “mind” , relating this solidly to emotions.
One question that Siegel’s discussion raises for me is whether the kind of neural substrate that develops under sub-optimal conditions may actually be more advantageous, from an evolutionary standpoint, for a child living in such conditions to possess, than the kind of neural structure that would develop under more optimal conditions. This may seem counterintuitive, but all children learn how to live in their specific environments, and that learning lets them function and survive within them to the best of their ability.
Is it possible that the kind of neural structures which children in sub-optimal conditions develop due to certain features of their environment likewise let them function and survive better in their specific situation? For example, might a child living in a harsh environment but possessing the kind of neural architecture that normally develops in a more nurturing climate be too sensitive to the depredations of that environment, and thus be more open to greater hurts and wounds? This is not to suggest that such development or learning is optimal, only that it may be more suited to a certain set of circumstances such that individuals possessing such structural forms in those circumstances may survive to pass on their genes better than those possessing other structural forms under the same conditions.
Siegel’s work is disturbing to read, in that it is difficult not to think about the implications for survivors of child abuse. If he is correct, then these children will suffer more than the pain of the abuse in the moment, or psychological difficulties later in life; their very intelligence and ability to function may be forever limited by their earliest experiences regardless of efforts they may make through therapy or similar treatments.
Michael Lewis, in “The Emergence of Human Emotions”, compares and contrasts a number of theories in search of a theory of development. He makes a case for a combination of experiential, cognitive developmental processes and “pre-wired” emotional circuitry present at birth. What his paper brings out the most is the extent to which more evidence and data are needed for any of the many theories and ideas about how emotion develops and is experienced in humans.
I disagreed with many of his statements and conclusions. For example, in his example involving a car accident, he tries to make the case that the driver did not experience her fear until after the danger was over. I disagree.
When my car hit black ice and traversed Interstate 84 from the far left lane across the middle and right lanes, doing three 360 degree revolutions on the way across, and finally bounced about 5 times off of the retaining fence, turning each time it bounced to hit in another place, I experienced several very remarkable sensations that can only have come from the basic emotion of fear. First of all, the entire incident happened, in my perception, in extreme slow motion. My mind reacted to an immediate adrenaline response, and became much more alert and quick than usual. Time seemed to slow down, but in reality it was simply that I was noticing much more about every moment, so it appeared to happen more slowly.
Second, there was no sound at all until the car had stopped moving entirely. My body routed all sensation to the one sense that would help me in this case, that of sight. Although my car certainly made a great deal of noise bouncing off the retaining fence, if not in its trip laterally across the road, I heard nothing at all until the sound of a fellow traveler tapping on my window afterward. My visual recollection of the event, however, is crystal clear, and very colorful.
Like James McGaugh’s medieval boy, thrown in the river to embed an important event in his memory the length of his life (McGaugh, ix), the accident is imprinted upon my memory in “living color”.
All of these were direct experiences of fear, although not ones I was familiar with as such. I am certain they were induced by the same bodily changes so many of the authors we have read attribute to the bodily side of emotion. They were not as easy to identify as the shaking hands, pounding heart and other somatic sensations I experienced once the car had come to rest and I’d had a moment to really think about what had happened, but they were a form of fear none the less, and I experienced them fully. Had I been in the wilderness and confronted by a large predator, I am sure that I would have acquired the ability to run very fast, or the strength to climb a tree quickly, or whatever else my brain and body decided I should do in what Damasio describes as emotion “ . . . making living beings act smartly without having to think smartly” (Damasio, xi).
Paul Harris looks at children’s understanding of emotion. He discusses a variety of developmental issues around emotion, such as how children report their own emotions and those of others, their memories of emotional incidents, and attachment theory in terms of language about and understanding of emotion.
I think that one of Harris’s most compelling and successful arguments is his relation of children’s facility with and knowledge about emotion, to popularity among other children. Correlating the real-life reactions of other children to the relative popularity of their peers, which are probably very likely to be extremely genuine, with a child’s results on various emotional tests, seems like a very good way to diagnose the validity of the tests and judge whether certain developmental experiences effect social development in the context of emotional development. I also very much appreciated that he cautioned against accepting these findings too easily, as he points out that “Acceptance by peers may increase children’s opportunities for learning abut emotion” (Harris, 288).
He offers many real-life-based examples to illustrate the points he is trying to make, which makes his work eminently readable, and displays a warm adn perceptive view of the human side of his subjects. He also seems to approach his premises and those of others in an extremely thoughtful manner. He often points out where very plausible-seeming reasoning may in fact be flawed. He also discusses some “ . . . emotional processes that may escape our awareness, but reveal themselves nonetheless via telltale facial expressions or various psychophysiological indices” (281). Here he grants a certain agency and dignity to the self, in keeping open the possibility that people may sense and know more than can be measured by testing and theorizing.
Ultimately, Harris sees the development of emotion as a resilient process, that may be interrupted but which is likely to proceed even if its end state is less than optimal (290). His emphasis on the importance of communication and rumination either at the time of development or later in the form of therapy or private journaling strikes another hopeful note, and his general attitude seems to be one of respect for the people he writes about.
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Monday, February 19, 2007
Reading Response for 2/21/07
Jake Szczypek
Reading Response #2
2/18/07
Attachment and the Emergence of Emotions
This week’s readings focused on the complex issue of emotional development in children. Siegel (2001), in particular, focused on attachment theory and the role of parental involvement in a child’s emotional maturation. I found his article to be of quite interest as it analyzed what, exactly, a secure attachment provides for an infants’ emotional functioning.
According to Siegel (2001), collaboration is a key component in the early stages of communication between an infant and his/her caregiver. Through the use of nonverbal signals, a caregiver and child can “connect” in a way that allows both individuals to “‘feel felt’ by the other” (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). The second major component in developing secure attachment is the “verbal sharing of a focus on the internal experience of each member of the dyad” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001). This form of communication is referred to as reflective dialogue, and allows for a child’s development of “mindsight.” The third component, repair, informs the child that communication will inevitably contain misunderstandings that will have to be identified in order to re-establish a sense of connectedness. Coherent narratives, the fourth component, are essential in developing a child’s autobiographical sense of self. And lastly, emotional communication is essential “in creating the foundation for a positive attitude toward the self and others” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001).
While I found these five elements of secure attachment to be helpful in understanding the important role caregivers play in the emotional development of children, it also made the concept of secure attachment seem overly simple. I tend to agree with Siegel’s (2001) notion that without the development of a secure attachment a child is not as likely to form “enhanced emotional flexibility, social functioning, and cognitive abilities” (Siegel, pp.77, 2001). However, I also think that a secure attachment can’t be the only determining factor in a child’s emotional stability.
According to Harris (2000), the greater coherence and degree of reflection in a mother’s description of her own attachment directly correlates to a greater “assessment of emotion understanding” in her child (Harris, pp.284, 2000). Thus, Harris and Siegel seem to agree that the Adult Attachment Interview studies indicate that a caregiver’s ability to talk about his/her emotions greatly influences the child’s own emotional development.
Furthermore, I found The Emergence of Human Emotions to be the most compelling article in this week’s readings. Lewis’ (2000) discussion of the development from emotional states, to emotional expressions, and then to emotional experiences was quite fascinating. While Harris and Siegel clearly embraced the standpoint of attachment theorists, Lewis brought forth the idea that emotional development might be biologically programmed and that a child’s emotional development will progress in a specific manner regardless of the outside environment. Lewis (2000) discusses this specifically referring to the differentiation of emotion states. Although further research must be done in order to determine whether emotional development is biologically predetermined or not, it is clear that familial input is a factor.
Siegel and Lewis both give examples of “transgenerational trauma” where a cyclical pattern develops between the caregiver and the child through multiple generations (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). I found this to be especially interesting because it indicates how truly affected we are, as infants, by our attachment figure(s). Additionally, Siegel (2001) mentioned how the development of the corpus callosum, and even the brain as a whole, can be greatly impaired when a child experiences abuse.
Lastly, I found the example that Lewis (2000) used to distinguish emotional states from emotional experiences to be worthy of noting. He described a woman losing control of her car and yet not experiencing fear until after the event. I understand that Lewis is saying the woman did not have a chance to consciously recognize her fear prior to stopping the car, but I have little doubt that she didn’t, on some level, sense the somatic changes occurring in her face (and body as a whole) while entering the state of fear. I have lost control of my car and I believe I experienced fear during the event, as well as after the event. Is this because I was attentive to my emotional state and could thus experience the emotion at the same time? Am I confusing emotional state and experience? Is it not conceivable that one can be conscious of an emotional state while also being cognitively aware of an emotional expression and experience?
Reading Response #2
2/18/07
Attachment and the Emergence of Emotions
This week’s readings focused on the complex issue of emotional development in children. Siegel (2001), in particular, focused on attachment theory and the role of parental involvement in a child’s emotional maturation. I found his article to be of quite interest as it analyzed what, exactly, a secure attachment provides for an infants’ emotional functioning.
According to Siegel (2001), collaboration is a key component in the early stages of communication between an infant and his/her caregiver. Through the use of nonverbal signals, a caregiver and child can “connect” in a way that allows both individuals to “‘feel felt’ by the other” (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). The second major component in developing secure attachment is the “verbal sharing of a focus on the internal experience of each member of the dyad” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001). This form of communication is referred to as reflective dialogue, and allows for a child’s development of “mindsight.” The third component, repair, informs the child that communication will inevitably contain misunderstandings that will have to be identified in order to re-establish a sense of connectedness. Coherent narratives, the fourth component, are essential in developing a child’s autobiographical sense of self. And lastly, emotional communication is essential “in creating the foundation for a positive attitude toward the self and others” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001).
While I found these five elements of secure attachment to be helpful in understanding the important role caregivers play in the emotional development of children, it also made the concept of secure attachment seem overly simple. I tend to agree with Siegel’s (2001) notion that without the development of a secure attachment a child is not as likely to form “enhanced emotional flexibility, social functioning, and cognitive abilities” (Siegel, pp.77, 2001). However, I also think that a secure attachment can’t be the only determining factor in a child’s emotional stability.
According to Harris (2000), the greater coherence and degree of reflection in a mother’s description of her own attachment directly correlates to a greater “assessment of emotion understanding” in her child (Harris, pp.284, 2000). Thus, Harris and Siegel seem to agree that the Adult Attachment Interview studies indicate that a caregiver’s ability to talk about his/her emotions greatly influences the child’s own emotional development.
Furthermore, I found The Emergence of Human Emotions to be the most compelling article in this week’s readings. Lewis’ (2000) discussion of the development from emotional states, to emotional expressions, and then to emotional experiences was quite fascinating. While Harris and Siegel clearly embraced the standpoint of attachment theorists, Lewis brought forth the idea that emotional development might be biologically programmed and that a child’s emotional development will progress in a specific manner regardless of the outside environment. Lewis (2000) discusses this specifically referring to the differentiation of emotion states. Although further research must be done in order to determine whether emotional development is biologically predetermined or not, it is clear that familial input is a factor.
Siegel and Lewis both give examples of “transgenerational trauma” where a cyclical pattern develops between the caregiver and the child through multiple generations (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). I found this to be especially interesting because it indicates how truly affected we are, as infants, by our attachment figure(s). Additionally, Siegel (2001) mentioned how the development of the corpus callosum, and even the brain as a whole, can be greatly impaired when a child experiences abuse.
Lastly, I found the example that Lewis (2000) used to distinguish emotional states from emotional experiences to be worthy of noting. He described a woman losing control of her car and yet not experiencing fear until after the event. I understand that Lewis is saying the woman did not have a chance to consciously recognize her fear prior to stopping the car, but I have little doubt that she didn’t, on some level, sense the somatic changes occurring in her face (and body as a whole) while entering the state of fear. I have lost control of my car and I believe I experienced fear during the event, as well as after the event. Is this because I was attentive to my emotional state and could thus experience the emotion at the same time? Am I confusing emotional state and experience? Is it not conceivable that one can be conscious of an emotional state while also being cognitively aware of an emotional expression and experience?
Sunday, February 18, 2007
Reading Response for 02/21/07
Aiyanna Sezak-Blatt
The Feeling Brain
This week’s reading focused less on emotions as physical expressions and discussed emotions as more conscious, socially influenced, and subjective experiences. These articles focused on emotional experience verses emotional states, and made a clear distinction between the two. An emotional state is a response to a stimulus that causes physical arousal and can often be un-conscious. An emotional experience is the internalization of a feeling and simultaneously connecting that feeling to a situation, event, or stimulus and is a conscious act that requires a sense of personal awareness. Ito have an emotional experiences knowledge of the self is required, and is implicit in a statement such as ‘I am happy’.
Michael Lewis, Paul Harris, and Daniel J. Siegel focus on identifying various stages of emotional transformation and development that accompany the maturation process. In isolating various stages of emotional development and factors that influence those stages, physiologists and biologists can better understand what is involved in internal, emotional representation. Emotional experiences and stages of self-awareness become more complex as we develop, and are strongly influenced by social interaction and parental care.
From birth to adulthood our emotional expressions change drastically. In the course of three years (from birth to age three) an infant will undergo a tremendous amount of emotional growth, and at each stage of development identifying an ‘emotional elicitor’ becomes increasingly complicated. Michael Lewis identifies three stages of emotional development in infants in his piece, “The Emergence of Human Emotions.” Lewis looks to emotional elicitors, stimulus that triggers an emotional state in and individual, to distinguish between stages of our emotional development. Emotional elicitors are autonomic and adaptive connections to emotions (i.e., food eliciting the feeling of happiness when we are hungry) and are also learned associations (Lewis, 2000). Emotional states can be triggered automatically and have an adaptive function (fear response to a predator). However, emotional states also arise from specific cognitive functions. The best example of this, as described in Lewis’ work, was the difference between a fear of falling downstairs verses a fear of failing a test. The latter is an emotional response to a specific cognitive process. The fear of failing is a conscious thought that can lead to a very specific emotional state.
As an infant matures his or her emotional elicitors become more and more complex. At the age of six months infants display six primary or early emotions: Contentment, Joy, Interest, Surprise, and Distrust, Anger/Fear. By 18 months emotional reactions are influenced by more conscious, “self referential behavior”, which give way to feelings such as embarrassment, empathy, and envy. These are known as “self-conscious emotions” (Lewis, 2000). The second major shift in emotional expression occurs between 2 ½ and 3 years of age. This “cognitive milestone” is characterized by a child’s capacity to evaluate their behavior to that of a learned standard. This is the point at which children evaluate their behavior relative to external expectations, for example, one can feel ashamed at failing a test and that feeling is produced because personal performance doesn’t live up to an outside expectation (that of a parent or a teacher). This stage is coined “self-conscious evaluative emotions”. Lewis’ work established a fascinating way in which to approach emotions as subjective states that develop as we do.
With a sense of self-consciousness and self-awareness children are able not only to understand their own emotional states, but they are able to make inferences about the states of others. This ability is coined ‘theory of mind’ or ‘mindsight’ and is discussed in Paul Harris and Daniel Siegel’s work. Paul Harris in, “Understanding Emotion”, looks at various stages of emotional understanding when children can identify their own emotional as well as those of others. Harris focused on the influence of family discussion in shaping an individual’s ability to recognize his or her own emotions. Social and familial care can greatly affect the way one relates, understands, and identifies an emotional experience: “parental attitudes and conversation have primary impact on the child’s own emotional life, which has in turn a beneficial effect on the child’s acknowledgement and understanding of emotion” (Harris, 2000). In a study conducted by Stelle, Steele, Croft, and Fonagy (1999), as discussed by Harris, called the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) a correlation between parental communicative ability and a child’s subsequent ability to discuss emotions concluding that, “children’s understanding of emotion is prompted in a relatively direct fashion by the conversational styles of their parent” (Harris, 2000). Harris’s work explores how parental communication and care can affect a child’s ability to recognize and talk about emotions.
Like Lewis, Daniel Siegel distinguishes between varying levels of emotions growth that correlate with our physical maturation. In “Toward An Interpersonal Neurobiology of the Developing Mind: Attachment Relationships, ‘Mindsight,’ and Neural Integration”, Siegel explores the evolution of the self, and how self-consciousness correlates to emotional understanding and expression. Siegel argues that as we mature we are constantly developing emotionally, and this growth continues throughout our lifetime. As children we pass through many stages of awareness and emotional expression: “emerging self” (after birth- taking in sensory data), “core self”, subjective self” (self and self other, including sharing with others and emotions between a child and a caregiver), “verbal self” and “narrative self”. The concept of passing through different stages of emotional maturity is fascinating and I think it compliment’s Lewis’s work well. Siegel views emotions as “complex layers of processes (such as appraisal or the evolution of meaning, and physical changes (such as endocrine, autonomic, and physiological)”. For every emotional reaction there is also a subjective response; and the two are intrinsically connected.
The subjective quality of emotional experience is an interesting and simultaneously complicated subject. As humans, we move through certain stages of emotional development, yet those stages are influenced by our individual experiences and environment. In thinking and in remembering we can bring about a change in our physical state; in understanding more about ourselves we can also infer more about others around us. Subjectivity itself is a universal quality of human emotion— our emotional experiences are deeply unique, yet at the same time, our emotional experiences connect us. We can understand each other because we understand ourselves.
The Feeling Brain
This week’s reading focused less on emotions as physical expressions and discussed emotions as more conscious, socially influenced, and subjective experiences. These articles focused on emotional experience verses emotional states, and made a clear distinction between the two. An emotional state is a response to a stimulus that causes physical arousal and can often be un-conscious. An emotional experience is the internalization of a feeling and simultaneously connecting that feeling to a situation, event, or stimulus and is a conscious act that requires a sense of personal awareness. Ito have an emotional experiences knowledge of the self is required, and is implicit in a statement such as ‘I am happy’.
Michael Lewis, Paul Harris, and Daniel J. Siegel focus on identifying various stages of emotional transformation and development that accompany the maturation process. In isolating various stages of emotional development and factors that influence those stages, physiologists and biologists can better understand what is involved in internal, emotional representation. Emotional experiences and stages of self-awareness become more complex as we develop, and are strongly influenced by social interaction and parental care.
From birth to adulthood our emotional expressions change drastically. In the course of three years (from birth to age three) an infant will undergo a tremendous amount of emotional growth, and at each stage of development identifying an ‘emotional elicitor’ becomes increasingly complicated. Michael Lewis identifies three stages of emotional development in infants in his piece, “The Emergence of Human Emotions.” Lewis looks to emotional elicitors, stimulus that triggers an emotional state in and individual, to distinguish between stages of our emotional development. Emotional elicitors are autonomic and adaptive connections to emotions (i.e., food eliciting the feeling of happiness when we are hungry) and are also learned associations (Lewis, 2000). Emotional states can be triggered automatically and have an adaptive function (fear response to a predator). However, emotional states also arise from specific cognitive functions. The best example of this, as described in Lewis’ work, was the difference between a fear of falling downstairs verses a fear of failing a test. The latter is an emotional response to a specific cognitive process. The fear of failing is a conscious thought that can lead to a very specific emotional state.
As an infant matures his or her emotional elicitors become more and more complex. At the age of six months infants display six primary or early emotions: Contentment, Joy, Interest, Surprise, and Distrust, Anger/Fear. By 18 months emotional reactions are influenced by more conscious, “self referential behavior”, which give way to feelings such as embarrassment, empathy, and envy. These are known as “self-conscious emotions” (Lewis, 2000). The second major shift in emotional expression occurs between 2 ½ and 3 years of age. This “cognitive milestone” is characterized by a child’s capacity to evaluate their behavior to that of a learned standard. This is the point at which children evaluate their behavior relative to external expectations, for example, one can feel ashamed at failing a test and that feeling is produced because personal performance doesn’t live up to an outside expectation (that of a parent or a teacher). This stage is coined “self-conscious evaluative emotions”. Lewis’ work established a fascinating way in which to approach emotions as subjective states that develop as we do.
With a sense of self-consciousness and self-awareness children are able not only to understand their own emotional states, but they are able to make inferences about the states of others. This ability is coined ‘theory of mind’ or ‘mindsight’ and is discussed in Paul Harris and Daniel Siegel’s work. Paul Harris in, “Understanding Emotion”, looks at various stages of emotional understanding when children can identify their own emotional as well as those of others. Harris focused on the influence of family discussion in shaping an individual’s ability to recognize his or her own emotions. Social and familial care can greatly affect the way one relates, understands, and identifies an emotional experience: “parental attitudes and conversation have primary impact on the child’s own emotional life, which has in turn a beneficial effect on the child’s acknowledgement and understanding of emotion” (Harris, 2000). In a study conducted by Stelle, Steele, Croft, and Fonagy (1999), as discussed by Harris, called the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) a correlation between parental communicative ability and a child’s subsequent ability to discuss emotions concluding that, “children’s understanding of emotion is prompted in a relatively direct fashion by the conversational styles of their parent” (Harris, 2000). Harris’s work explores how parental communication and care can affect a child’s ability to recognize and talk about emotions.
Like Lewis, Daniel Siegel distinguishes between varying levels of emotions growth that correlate with our physical maturation. In “Toward An Interpersonal Neurobiology of the Developing Mind: Attachment Relationships, ‘Mindsight,’ and Neural Integration”, Siegel explores the evolution of the self, and how self-consciousness correlates to emotional understanding and expression. Siegel argues that as we mature we are constantly developing emotionally, and this growth continues throughout our lifetime. As children we pass through many stages of awareness and emotional expression: “emerging self” (after birth- taking in sensory data), “core self”, subjective self” (self and self other, including sharing with others and emotions between a child and a caregiver), “verbal self” and “narrative self”. The concept of passing through different stages of emotional maturity is fascinating and I think it compliment’s Lewis’s work well. Siegel views emotions as “complex layers of processes (such as appraisal or the evolution of meaning, and physical changes (such as endocrine, autonomic, and physiological)”. For every emotional reaction there is also a subjective response; and the two are intrinsically connected.
The subjective quality of emotional experience is an interesting and simultaneously complicated subject. As humans, we move through certain stages of emotional development, yet those stages are influenced by our individual experiences and environment. In thinking and in remembering we can bring about a change in our physical state; in understanding more about ourselves we can also infer more about others around us. Subjectivity itself is a universal quality of human emotion— our emotional experiences are deeply unique, yet at the same time, our emotional experiences connect us. We can understand each other because we understand ourselves.
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