The [In]Existence? of Unconscious Emotions

This week’s readings discussed the definition, neural processes and various brain structures involved with hedonics/reward. Additionally, the papers attempted to differentiate between conscious and unconscious emotions.

In any scientific field, but especially psychology, members often become so transfixed by popular schools of thought or the latest controversial ideas that they can forget the actual purpose of the discipline: to help people. This made Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s description of “positive psychology," the study of positive emotions, characters and institutions, especially refreshing. It forced me to focus not only on how the concepts discussed in class affect people, but how to utilize recently acquired findings to improve people’s psychical and psychological health and overall quality of life. The articles also noted people’s tendency, which is all too apparent in the popular subjects of current psychological research, to focus almost exclusively on negative ideas. The authors predictably assumed the evolutionary perspective noting that our tendency to focus more on potential problems stems from our innate need for self-preservation, which is much more likely to be affected by something negative, like a hungry predator or violent competitor for resources.

In “The Peculiar Longevity of Things Not So Bad,” the authors noted how the effect of mildly negative stimuli is actually worse than that of severely negative ones. We know that our brains are specially programmed to process tragedies, but this article explained that milder tragedies or “things not so bad” are not processed the same way, which explains why the effects of supposedly milder negative stimuli can potentially last so much longer.

But the most interesting and contentious articles this week concerned the potential existence of unconscious emotions. I admit that after weeks of attempting to accept that emotions are, for the most part, predictable responses and therefore largely controllable, I initially found Berridge’s various articles refreshing. However, I was ultimately unconvinced of the existence of unconscious emotions.

In “What is an unconscious emotions?: (The case for unconscious ‘liking’),” Berridge and Winkielman attempt to modify William Jame’s classic definition of emotion as “the conscious experience or subjective feeling of emotion” to include those experienced on an unconscious level. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 181–182) I agree that both positive and negative emotions can be elicited by subliminal (i.e. unconsciously recognized) stimuli, for example, the negligible exposure to various facial expressions. I also agree that this unconscious recognition can dramatically influence an individual’s behavior, decisions and opinions, as proven by the subjects’ consequentially influenced appraisal and consumption of the beverage. However, I feel that both the unconscious recognition of emotionally charged stimuli and the resulting influence on behavior are the result of previously proven existent unconscious cognitive processes, like implicit memory and implicit perception, rather than an unconscious emotional experience. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) I agree with Clore who argues that, “ . . . it is not possible to have an unconscious emotion because emotion involves an experience, and one cannot have an experience that is not experienced . . . emotions cannot be unconscious because they must be felt, and feelings are by definition conscious. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 183)

I felt that Berridge et al largely missed the point in their attempt to define and prove, or at least provide evidence for, the existence of unconscious emotion. Firstly, their definition for unconscious or “’implicit emotion refers to the changes in experience, thought or action that are attributed to one’s emotional state, independent of his or her conscious awareness of that state” is significantly flawed. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) Unconscious emotion refers only to a change in experience. Any resulting “changes in thought or action” are merely effects of this presumed emotional state, but not the state itself. A smile is not happiness itself, only the result of it. They elaborate further by citing “inaccurate labeling of the exact nature of one’s emotion, as when one angrily denies that one is angry” in addition to “errors of attention, as when one realizes only later that one has been gripped by an emotional experience at an earlier time.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) However, the authors are forced to admit that individuals in such cases are still “fully conscious of the events that cause the emotion, and one may be conscious of the many effects of emotion. Moreover, the actual emotional state is presumed capable of being made conscious if only the person’s full attention is directed to the emotional experience, and the right label is provided. (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) They admit that the unconscious emotional experience or “truly implicit affect would require the demonstration of an affective reaction of which one was simply not aware, even upon introspection.” (Berridge & Winkielman 2003, 184) As such, the existence of implicit emotions is ultimately impossible to prove, regardless of what may be construed as supporting evidence from observed behavioral responses. To conclude, the initial stimulus or reason behind an emotional experience can be unconscious, however, the actual emotional experience, not to be confused with any resulting changes in thought or behavior, is a subjective feeling or experiences and therefore intrinsically conscious.