Jake Szczypek
Reading Response #2
2/18/07
Attachment and the Emergence of Emotions
This week’s readings focused on the complex issue of emotional development in children. Siegel (2001), in particular, focused on attachment theory and the role of parental involvement in a child’s emotional maturation. I found his article to be of quite interest as it analyzed what, exactly, a secure attachment provides for an infants’ emotional functioning.
According to Siegel (2001), collaboration is a key component in the early stages of communication between an infant and his/her caregiver. Through the use of nonverbal signals, a caregiver and child can “connect” in a way that allows both individuals to “‘feel felt’ by the other” (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). The second major component in developing secure attachment is the “verbal sharing of a focus on the internal experience of each member of the dyad” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001). This form of communication is referred to as reflective dialogue, and allows for a child’s development of “mindsight.” The third component, repair, informs the child that communication will inevitably contain misunderstandings that will have to be identified in order to re-establish a sense of connectedness. Coherent narratives, the fourth component, are essential in developing a child’s autobiographical sense of self. And lastly, emotional communication is essential “in creating the foundation for a positive attitude toward the self and others” (Siegel, pp.79, 2001).
While I found these five elements of secure attachment to be helpful in understanding the important role caregivers play in the emotional development of children, it also made the concept of secure attachment seem overly simple. I tend to agree with Siegel’s (2001) notion that without the development of a secure attachment a child is not as likely to form “enhanced emotional flexibility, social functioning, and cognitive abilities” (Siegel, pp.77, 2001). However, I also think that a secure attachment can’t be the only determining factor in a child’s emotional stability.
According to Harris (2000), the greater coherence and degree of reflection in a mother’s description of her own attachment directly correlates to a greater “assessment of emotion understanding” in her child (Harris, pp.284, 2000). Thus, Harris and Siegel seem to agree that the Adult Attachment Interview studies indicate that a caregiver’s ability to talk about his/her emotions greatly influences the child’s own emotional development.
Furthermore, I found The Emergence of Human Emotions to be the most compelling article in this week’s readings. Lewis’ (2000) discussion of the development from emotional states, to emotional expressions, and then to emotional experiences was quite fascinating. While Harris and Siegel clearly embraced the standpoint of attachment theorists, Lewis brought forth the idea that emotional development might be biologically programmed and that a child’s emotional development will progress in a specific manner regardless of the outside environment. Lewis (2000) discusses this specifically referring to the differentiation of emotion states. Although further research must be done in order to determine whether emotional development is biologically predetermined or not, it is clear that familial input is a factor.
Siegel and Lewis both give examples of “transgenerational trauma” where a cyclical pattern develops between the caregiver and the child through multiple generations (Siegel, pp.78, 2001). I found this to be especially interesting because it indicates how truly affected we are, as infants, by our attachment figure(s). Additionally, Siegel (2001) mentioned how the development of the corpus callosum, and even the brain as a whole, can be greatly impaired when a child experiences abuse.
Lastly, I found the example that Lewis (2000) used to distinguish emotional states from emotional experiences to be worthy of noting. He described a woman losing control of her car and yet not experiencing fear until after the event. I understand that Lewis is saying the woman did not have a chance to consciously recognize her fear prior to stopping the car, but I have little doubt that she didn’t, on some level, sense the somatic changes occurring in her face (and body as a whole) while entering the state of fear. I have lost control of my car and I believe I experienced fear during the event, as well as after the event. Is this because I was attentive to my emotional state and could thus experience the emotion at the same time? Am I confusing emotional state and experience? Is it not conceivable that one can be conscious of an emotional state while also being cognitively aware of an emotional expression and experience?
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
10 comments:
I also found Siegel’s paper to be informative as it brings together developmental research in psychology and links it to brain structure and development. He made me wonder as I have in the past if a mental illness that has genetic roots can never be activated. Can someone be genetically predisposed to having schizophrenia or depression yet never suffer from it?
And to address Jakes last paragraph, today I had an experience where I lost control of a situation that could have ended badly, but luckily nothing serious happened because I immediately acted to correct it. There was a moment though before I acted where I thought about how scary and bazaar the event was. Without being aware of how afraid I was I don’t think the quickness of reaction would have been the same. I even thought afterwards about this duality in our reading and was assured that they occur simultaneously under my awareness and if anything, was responsible for the outcome.
I was happy to begin reading about the developmental side to the psychological aspects we have been looking at. I especially found it interesting when Siegel beings to talk about memory in terms of emotional relativity and development. And how even though we may not have an "explicit" form of memory as infants we are still affected in ways that last throughout our lifetimes. I think that tying these facts to the other points we have discussed so far in this course offers useful insight and context for understanding subconcious emotional reactions.
Although the time spent between a child and his/her cargivers seems like an obvious crucial part of human development, I found Siegel's in depth article on the subject very interesting. I appreciate how he meshes the biological aspects (an infant's genetic program to form 'attachments,' which serve the 'motivational system,' etc.) and the pyschological aspects of development. I think it is especially important not to separate the biological and the pyschological, which a lot of the authors we've read do--but one can't work without the other and they effect each other all the time. One thing that was not discussed thoroughly was the idea of the possible negative outcomes of 'over-attachment', which could be an interesting subject--although the effects of over-attachment may not become apparent until later in life.
I found Daniel Siegel’s article, too, to be particularly fascinating. One thing I was really interested in is his discussion of complexity theory and his understanding of development as a “movement toward more complex states of processing over the lifespan (p.85)” I liked Siegel’s description of how the greatest complexity may be due to combining an appreciation for differentiation (the specific and individual) with integration (seeing commonalities).
These concepts made me think about the developmental theory of Heinz Werner who lived from 1890-1964. Werner too believed that development involved higher levels of integration and the ability to make use of a qualitatively different model of thought. He spoke of an early sphere of thought as involving perception of magic and expressiveness in all of the world around us—a type of thought typical of children. As we mature and gain more experience in the world, we learn to categorize and sort and think without emotion intrinsically being embedded in the evaluation. But Werner believed that people could continue, to their great benefit, to be able to make use of earlier spheres of thought. He saw artists as people who are wonderful at straddling these spheres of thinking, remaining responsive to the particular and magical but connecting what they observe to larger constructs of meaning
Werner’s spheres strike me as being somewhat analogous to the concepts of differentiation/integration that Siegel discusses. It seems like they are both suggesting that it is possible and desirable to fluidly straddle types of thinking, in the end finding deeper integration. I find it really satisfying that some of the developmental theory that I find most resonant and appealing on an intuitive level is being rearticulated by people now studying the current research on development and the brain.
Seigel's paragraphs on memory were particularly interesting to me because I've never read much about the development of memory in terms of its emotional rammifications. Just judging from my own experience memories that I can recall are often tied to a specifically strong emotion or individual who has a particualr significance to me. In order to remember something it must be tied to something in which your body and emotions remember something as well.... I really liked reading about the developmental aspects of memory and its involvment in emotions.
Before this class, I had spent most of my education in emotions with the developmental aspect. I was glad to have these readings this week because I think that looking at the genesis of emotions is incredibly interesting and important. How can we study emotions if we do not know where/how they begin in infancy? The relationship between the parent and the child is so influential on a child's ability to understand emotion. Can we understand emotions before we utilize all of them? Or are our parents giving us the tools to identify expression and title? Children are capable of being taught the "wrong" reaction as in not knowing to stay away from strangers (Lewis 267), but how can we really say that is wrong? I think that is more of a cultural/social question, but how do those aspects factor into the development of emotions?
In the Siegel article, I was particularly interested in the comparison between implicit and explicit memory. As was mentioned by Julia, the idea that we can be affected by events during the first years before explicit memory develops. To think that we are permanently processing connections that we won't remember making is incredibly interesting.
As a donnee of Carl Barenboim, I, like Julia, was very excited to read about the child development/emotional development. In the Lewis article, I was particularly interested in emotions are tied to specific conscious physiological and cognitive states. I would like to discuss further how then individuals so often are unaware of the emotional state they are in - or in other cases, are aware but chose to suppress it. How is it possible to suppress emotional states when they are so tied to physiological changes? Can one truly control these types of reactions?
I think the Siegel article started out a little slow, but he definitely raised some compelling and entertaining points. I liked the last few pages, where he notes that many psychological problems are the result of uncontrollable, undesired low-order processing. It's strange to think that reflexive responses have become automatic because they have proved so advantageous over time, yet they can also cause major difficulties. What else is interesting is that Lewis shows that cognitive, respondent emotions such as embarassment arise only after the acquisition of conscious self-referential behavior - an ability that would be considered high-order processing.
I am reminded again of my curiosity about the emotional states (whatever it is that means) of feral children. I would assume they do not feel the aforementioned social emotions like embarassment, pride, shame, etc., but would Lewis claim that this implies they are not consciously experiencing? Human consciousness is highly complex and unique amongst all animals, so can a social life of animals actually stifle the development of consciousness?
I also had trouble accepting the explanation presented by Lewis regarding the women who lost control of her car. He claims that in the moment of losing control she is predominantly experiencing fear but is unaware of it until after the fact. I think that Lewis is confusing the IDEA of a fearful situation with the true emotional experience in the given situation. To experience predominantly fear while trying to regain control of ones vehicle would likely interfere with if not inhibit ones ability to react effectively (retract, shake). While the immediate experience may invoke a new physiological state (alertness perhaps), this greater sense of fear may not set in until after the fact when assigning the experience meaning. This order of events may not be true, or true in all cases. One could be in a situation where an immediate emotional response may be useful in evoking an appropriate physical response, but I do not think that the example provided by Lewis is such a case.
In this post scenario case a great sense of fear is an interesting emotion as the individual is no longer undergoing the fearful event.
Post a Comment